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1. Introduction 
1.1 Theme and justification 
Since the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 the world has witnessed an 
unprecedented expansion of international recognized human rights.
1
 Nevertheless, a world 
in compliance with human rights continues to be one of the most important challenges 
facing the international community. Respecting the dignity of every individual human 
being and creating a legal climate in which human rights can flourish are not only 
fundamental ethical requirements, but also preconditions for sustainable political stability, 
as well as for economic and social development in the world.
2
 Over the past fifteen years 
the intensification of globalization and the liberalization of trade, combined with the 
scrutiny of non governmental organizations (NGOs), the media and other actors in civil 
society, have led to a focus on how Transnational Corporations (TNCs) influence the 
societies in which they operate. Changes caused by the economic globalization and 
advancement in communication technologies have left a state-centered approach to human 
rights inadequate and have led to a call for a change in our conception of the nature of 
human rights and the relationship between different actors within it.
3
 Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) has become a catchphrase in the international development agenda as 
one has started to realize that it is impossible to combat today‟s obstacles to a world in 
compliance with human rights without the participation of the business sector. Public 
demands for companies to behave responsible, pressure from affected communities and 
naming and shaming campaigns by NGOs are growing, and these demands are increasingly 
framed in terms of human rights.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Smith (2007)p.1 
2
 BDA (2010)p.3 
3
 Alston (2005)p. 4 
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Every year developing countries lose billions of dollars through tax evasion and extensive 
tax avoidance by powerful TNCs, which are some of the largest tax payers in the world.
 4
 A 
great portion of developing countries‟ already scarce revenues is vanishing without the 
population benefitting from the human rights obligations its states have undertaken by 
becoming part of human rights conventions. Tax revenues are an essential source for 
evoking resources that enable the government to promote the realizations of human rights, 
yet taxation has received little attention compared to other financing issues such as trade, 
aid and debt.
 5
 While the focus of many has been on increasing aid flows from developed to 
developing states, too little attention has been paid to the much larger flows in the other 
direction.
6
 Many companies advertise their philanthropic contributions to the societies in 
which they operate, such as building a school in a developing country. However, it 
becomes clear that something is wrong when the same companies avoid paying taxes that 
could build 50 schools in the same country.
7
  The call for attention has recently become 
louder. The director of the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, Christopher 
Avery, said at his presentation at a side event at the Human Rights Council in October in 
2009: 
 
 “if I am asked to identify emerging business and human rights issues that will likely get much more attention 
in the coming years, I would put tax avoidance or tax evasion at the top of this list”.  8  
 
Others have compared efforts to include tax in the development discourse with the attention given 
to the environment ten years ago, and assessed it to get as much attention as environment issues do 
today in  ten years time.
9
 The emerging consensus on the gigantic cost to development of extensive 
tax minimization can be illustrated by the UNs‟ Secretary General (UNSG) drawing attention to the 
issue in a recent high-level meeting of the Economic and Social Council.
10
 
                                                 
4
 Baker(2005)p.171, Christian Aid (2008) , Cobham (2007) 
5
 Stener, Alson, and Goodman (2007) p.305 , Kokke & Weyzig (2008) p.1 
6
 Martens(2007) 
7
 Avery(2009) :oral  presentation  
8
Ibid.  
9
 Owens in Houlder (2004) 
10
 Ban-ki Moon (2010):oral presentation 
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1.2 Research questions 
There are numerous aspects which are of great importance on the agenda to hamper 
extensive tax minimization, such as strengthening tax authorities and financial 
administration, combating corruption and bribery and reducing the informal economy. 
Nevertheless, this paper will focus on the role of TNCs‟ tax policy, not because the other 
topics‟ less importance, but because of the scope of this thesis. Recently, an increasing 
number of NGOs have reported on TNCs‟ extensive tax minimization and its harmful 
impact on the societies in which the corporations are operating. However, few have looked 
at tax evasion and tax avoidance as a human rights concern. Seeing extensive tax 
minimization as an obstacle for human rights compliance offers a potential for something 
being done to hamper its harmful consequences. This is because human rights summarize 
the fundamental interests of human beings based on shared ideas about the requirements for 
a dignified life, which both states and non-state actors are legally and morally bound to 
respect and realize.
11
  The legal human rights responsibility of TNCs is controversial and 
this thesis will therefore examine whether prevention of extensive tax minimization is, or 
whether it should be, incorporated in this responsibility. It is important to emphasize that 
action is needed by governments, individually and collectively, to address extensive tax 
minimization through improved laws and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, this thesis will 
also examine state responsibility towards fiscal matters as a human rights related issue. 
More concretely the primary research question of this thesis is: 
 
1. To what degree is extensive tax minimization by TNCs a human rights concern? 
 
Because human rights law still falls short of implementing regulations on TNCs regarding these 
issues, this thesis will address how efforts to hamper extensive tax minimization is demonstrated by 
the CSR agenda, where human rights is an important component. The secondary research question 
will be: 
2. Should efforts to reduce extensive tax minimization be integrated in the CSR agenda from a 
human rights perspective? 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
11
 OHCHR(2008) p.2 
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1.3 Terminology clarification  
1.3.1 Transnational Corporations  
A major theme in this thesis is that TNCs play an increasingly important role with regard to 
human rights compliance. A broad definition of TNCs will be used in this paper in order to 
capture their diversity and complexity.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development‟s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE) do not define the 
term but states that:
 
 
 
“These usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that 
they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to 
exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise 
may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or mixed.”
 12
 
 
MNE and TNC are both used to express the same. Regardless of the term used, it is their 
ability to operate across national frontiers and outside the effective supervision of domestic 
and international law that makes them important actors needing greater investigation under 
international law.
13
 Although their relative importance varies enormously, there are few 
parts of the world that rest unaffected by TNCs‟ influence.14 TNCs are primary capitalist 
enterprises, and they behave according to the most fundamental rule of capitalism, the drive 
for profit.
15
 With this in mind it can be questioned whether TNCs‟ pursuit of growth and 
profit enables them to exercise sincere respect for human rights.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 OECD(2008) Chapter 1, §3 
13
 Wells and Elias In :Alson (2005): 149 
14
 Dickens(2004) 
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 Ibid. p.199 
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1.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility  
There is no universally accepted definition of this term partly because it is being used both 
descriptively and normatively. CSR refers some times to what the corporations should do, 
and other times to what the corporations actually do.
16
  Because of the expanding range of 
issues being handled under the collective term of CSR, and the fact that different 
stakeholders promoting CSR emphasize different aspects, it is often pointed out that there 
is not a uniform CSR agenda. Nevertheless, this thesis uses the term because there is an 
agenda in the sense that there is an increasing agreement on issues that companies should 
be concerned with, and because CSR represents a particular approach to corporate 
regulation, one that is voluntary and based on self regulation.
17
 CSR is by many regarded to 
be a vehicle through which the private sector can participate in poverty reduction and other 
social purposes, which is not possible to achieve through government acting alone.
18
 In its 
most common sense, CSR is used to describe corporate behavior which is ethical and has 
regard to social and environmental interests as well as financial considerations, as reflected 
in the World Bank‟s working definition: 
 
“commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their 
families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life.”19 
 
Numerous TNCs use sustainable development as a superior frame for their CSR-strategy.
20
 
Sustainable development can be defined as: “meeting needs and aspirations of the present 
without compromising the ability to meet those of the future”. 21 Further: 
 
“Far from requiring the cessation of economic growth, it recognizes the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment cannot be solved unless we have a new era of growth in which developing countries plays 
a large role and reap large benefits.” 22 
 
                                                 
16
 Jelstad (2005) 
17
 Utting (2007) p.710, note 7. 
18
 Fox (2004) p.29 
19
 Ward (2004) p.3 
20
 Fox (2004) p.29 
21
 WCED (1987) §.49 
22
 Ibid. 
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Many TNCs incorporate concerns relating to human rights in their CSR reporting. Current 
thinking in the field suggests that because TNCs can potentially affect all internationally 
recognized human rights, the suitable scope of human rights for companies to consider 
when reporting includes, at a minimum, the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and its two implementing instruments: the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
23
 One can roughly divide CSR strategies 
in two, namely “do no harm” and “do good”. From a human rights perspective “do no 
harm” means not to violate human rights, and the “do good” strategy will include 
contributing to or create a system of rights protection and aid to those deprived of their 
rights.
24
 The current trend belongs within the former strategy.  
 
There is also an important debate concerning whether CSR strategies should be legally 
binding or based on voluntary initiatives. Mary Robinson is one of those who argue that as 
human rights have become increasingly threatened by non-state actors, there is a need for a 
legal regime to emphasize the value of an ethical globalization, implying that voluntary 
guidelines by TNC are not enough.
25
 There are few who argue openly that corporations 
should not have any responsibility to act in respect with the society and the environment 
where they operate. The discordance is about what should be included in this responsibility 
and whether these regulations should come from the corporations themselves or through 
binding international political regulations.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Ulmas (2009) p.4 
24
 Kolstad, Wiik and Larsen (2008) p.4 
25
 Mary Robbinson. “Globalization has to take human rights into account”. Irish Times, January 22.2002 In: 
Andreassen (2006) p.124 
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1.3.3 Extensive tax minimization 
In order to comprise both illegal tax evasion and legal but irresponsible tax avoidance, this 
thesis will employ the term extensive tax minimization. Whereas tax evasion always is 
illegal, tax avoidance may constitute of non- or low payment of taxes through agreements 
with governments, benefiting from loopholes, subsidies, creative accounting practices, etc. 
Although these measures may be legal under national law, they rise concerns about 
whether the tax avoidance harms the government‟s ability to meet its obligations to provide 
for fundamental internationally-recognized human rights. Beloe, Cruickshank and Lye 
make the following distinction between the legal and illegal boundary and a softer 
boundary between what is responsible and irresponsible:
26
 
 
                                                                               Absolute boundary       Blurred boundary between  
                                                                               between legal and         irresponsible and                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                        illegal                            responsible 
                        
 
1
 Beloe and Lye (2006) p.2 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis will follow the logic of this model because instead of focusing entirely on an 
absolute boundary between illegal and legal approaches to tax, it will also look into what is 
considered responsible and what is regarded as irresponsible. 
 
                                                 
26
Beloe, Cruickshank and Lye (2006) p.2 
 
   Evasion                Sham                                        Avoidance                 Mitigation 
  Always illegal       Illegal with                                Technically legal        Legal and  
                                the appearance of legality                                             welcomed 
                                      of legality 
 8 
1.3.4 Responsible and fair tax 
Many NGOs argue that in order to behave in a morally responsible way, companies should 
adopt an attitude towards tax planning which will ensure that they pay their “fair share” of 
tax.
27
 This leaves open the question concerning what to include in the term “fair”. There are 
different views regarding the distinction between what one observes as fair and unfair, or 
responsible and irresponsible, with regard to tax planning. Political affiliation will play its 
part, in general left wing governments tend to favor higher taxes and higher public 
spending than right wing governments. The fact that different economic schools vary in 
what they consider the best tax practice further complicate the task of arguing for an ethical 
fair or responsible way of planning a corporation‟s tax policy towards the society in which 
it operates. However, in practice many observers may think that they will recognize 
fairness when they see it, or at least that they will recognize unfairness when it occurs.
28
 
This does not take away the critical need for more research and development of methods of 
analysis which can facilitate this debate. Many would argue that in democratic states, the 
peoples‟ elected representatives should be trusted to undertake by legislation a level of tax 
that is considered fair. Companies can in accordance with this view pay the minimum tax 
determined by law and still be considered responsible.
29
 Contrary to this view, this paper 
will argue that what is legal is not necessarily fair and responsible. A TNC who wants to be 
regarded as acting in a responsible and sustainable manner should be expected not 
exclusively to see tax as a cost to be avoided, but as a legitimate payment from wealth 
created to the countries and communities that advanced the wealth creation.
30
 These 
concerns has little to do with fairness in the sense of treating all parties equally, than with a 
sense that they have a responsibility not to take advantage of countries that do not have the 
economic or political muscle to take care of themselves.
31 
This thesis will argue that TNCs 
should have a responsibility to contribute in generating tax revenue to the host state, this is 
                                                 
27
 Williams(2007) p.21 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Beloe, Cruickshank and Lye (2006) p.4 
31
 Williams (2007) p.29 
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the fair thing to do because of the state‟s role in promoting welfare in society.32 Possible 
definitions of fair and responsible tax could insist that tax for foreign investment is at least 
equal to taxation of local companies or that it should as a minimum cover the host-
countrys‟ expenses relating to the corporations‟ operations. The level of responsible 
taxation will therefore vary in different countries. A corporate framework that seeks to 
ensure a responsible and fair approach to tax policies should be based on guiding principles 
of accountability, transparency and consistency. This paper will not go further into which 
ways TNCs can make judgment on these issues, only saying that they should implement 
considerations about their tax strategies‟ consequences for the countries where they 
operate.
33
  
 
Another issue relating to what fair and responsible tax should be occurs when TNCs are 
operating in host states which are ruled by oppressive governments. It might be argued that 
in these circumstances it is best that corporations pay as little tax as possible, in order to 
avoid extending this government‟s life. However, this thesis argues that where  a TNC 
suspect that its tax payment will not be used on protecting and fulfilling obligations under a 
human rights covenant which the country have signed, it might instead use its negotiation 
power to insist on increased spending relating to these issues. The “might” in the last 
sentence is of crucial importance as this thesis will not pursue to give a universal answer to 
what corporation‟s aught to do in specific circumstances in order to act responsible with 
regard to tax. This is because factual empirical conclusion must be taken on a case-to-case 
basis in order to be analyzed contextually. 
 
1.4 Methodology and a brief literature review 
The thesis will analyze these issues in a multidisciplinary perspective, taking ethical, legal 
and political argumentation into account. It will be an explorative and argumentative paper, 
                                                 
32
 Ibid.p.19 
33
 Beloe, Cruickshank & Lye(2006) p.25-29 presents several approaches that may assist TNCs to put some 
context around the issue of responsible tax and help develop a more nuanced understanding of potential 
trajectories. 
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which will examine “de lege ferenda”, a Latin expression which means "what the law 
should be", as opposed to “lex lata” which means "the law as it exists”.  As few have 
looked at extensive tax minimization in light of human rights, it is important to note that 
more research and knowledge is needed in this field. This thesis maps and assesses the 
most relevant available documentation from different stakeholders. Internet has been the 
main search engine, as most reports and articles today are available online. The findings 
have not been a result of simply searching Google for relevant literature, rather the 
different stakeholders‟ web pages have been accessed. Different stakeholders who address 
global tax issues include the civil society through NGOs, state actors through governments, 
non-state actors such as TNCs, and multinational organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN) and Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Business 
and Human Rights‟ Resource Center has recently introduced a new section of their 
webpage
34
 relating to tax avoidance and human rights. This webpage has been an important 
source when searching for relevant literature. It introduces material on tax evasion and tax 
avoidance by the private sector, and provides links to further reports relevant to the topic. 
Books and reports which have not been accessible through the internet have been accessed 
by contacting the relevant organizations, bought through internet stores or rented at the 
University‟s bibliotheca. Reports from NGOs including Tax Justice Network, Christian Aid 
and Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations have been assessed, while keeping 
a critical mind as these organizations write reports according to their agendas. One 
important entry point for advocacy around the issues of corporate responsibility towards 
human rights within the UN is the mandate of the Secretary General‟s Special 
Representative (SGSR) on Business and Human Rights; Professor John Ruggie. UN 
literature is found through UN‟s document search online.35 Key international standards 
with relevance for the chosen topic include the UDHR and the ICESCR with its General 
Comments no. 3 and 4. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ (CESCR) 
Concluding Observations has also been assessed to search for concerns regarding states‟ 
fiscal policy. 
                                                 
34
 http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home Accessed 18.02.2010 
35
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
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One significant challenge in writing a thesis on this topic has been the lack of data 
pinpointing the assumed correlation between lost state tax revenues and the state‟s reduced 
ability to deliver to its population on human rights issues. The thesis is not suggesting that 
all revenues that are lost to tax evasion and tax avoidance would necessarily be channeled 
to important elements of human rights conventions, such as health and education. It is 
essential to note that there are many complex and interconnected issues involved, such as 
corruption and bribery which is difficult to measure. The thesis also acknowledges the 
danger of drawing a casual correlation between low taxes and low human rights 
compliance on a general level, because factual empirical conclusions must be made on a 
case-to-case basis in order to be analyzed contextually. Nevertheless, a report by Christian 
Aid from 2008: “Death and taxes: the true toll of tax dodging” has been significant in 
addressing the assumed correlation between tax and the protection and fulfillment of 
certain human rights. The report has calculated that the prospects for poor people in 
developing countries could be dramatically changed for the better if the same amount of tax 
revenues were spent on healthcare today, as it did in 2000. They argue that the life of 
350.000 children under the age of five would be saved every year if one managed to get an 
end to tax evasion. Christian Aid estimates that since the UN Millennium Goals (MDG) 
were set in 2000, the developing world has lost tax revenues with the value of an estimated 
US$ 160 billion a year, as a result of tax evasion. This is substantially more than the 
amount of development aid received each year in the same period. If the current level 
continues without something being done about it, the tax revenue losses caused by tax 
evasion will consist of US $2.5 trillion by 2015.
36
  It is important to note that these 
numbers are calculated based on tax evasion, and if one were to include the losses due to 
extensive tax avoidance as well, the figures would increase dramatically.  These important 
numbers illustrates that  measures to tackle extensive tax minimization can raise vital 
public revenues which can potentially facilitate efforts to meet important elements of 
human rights realization. 
                                                 
36
 See Christian Aid (2008) p.51-53 for the methodology used to measure the association between tax 
revenues and under five mortality rates, and the calculations of tax losses due to evasion. 
 12 
 
When examining which ethical responsibility TNCs should have towards fiscal affairs 
when operating in a developing country, a report written by Kolstad Wiik and Larsen has 
been of particular importance. In it Norwegian CSR activities in developing countries are 
addressed by looking into the issue of human rights and assigned ethical responsibilities for 
corporations.  Further essential litterature will be presented as they are applied  in the text. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
In order to address whether extensive tax minimization by TNCs is a human rights concern, 
section two will start with discussing whether or not TNCs should be incorporated in the 
human rights regime which is primarily for states.  Acknowledging that the business sector 
indeed is a right-holder in the human rights regime, this thesis will focus on which indirect 
and direct human rights duties one can point towards TNCs, as well as looking into 
international voluntary initiatives for strengthening the business sector‟s role in relation to 
human rights. Section three will address the importance of tax, followed by an assessment 
of harmful tax behavior through tax evasion and extensive tax avoidance. Thereafter it will 
connect the states‟ human rights responsibilities to fiscal policy through an examination of 
article 2.1. in the ICESCR.  As states‟ legal responsibility towards introducing a responsible 
system of taxation interpreted from the above mentioned article is difficult to enforce, this 
thesis will look into which ethical responsibility TNCs should have regarding their fiscal 
agenda. Section four will consider to what degree tax related issues are incorporated in 
TNC‟s CSR agenda and examine briefly why they should be. 
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2. Human rights responsibilities of TNCs as non-state actors  
2.1 Should TNCs be incorporated in the human rights regime? 
2.1.1 The state as the primary duty-bearer 
When a state becomes party to a human rights convention it undertakes responsabiitites 
toward the rights contained in the respective convention. Governments have a clear and 
direct obligation towards human rights and they are the primary duty-beares under 
international human rights law. Eide articulate three different levels of obligations, notably 
to respect, protect and fulfill.
37
 The obligation to respect entails the state‟s duty to abstain 
from doing something that violates the integrity of the individual or infringes her or his 
freedom. The obligation to protect requires from the state the measures necessary to 
prevent other individuals or groups from violating the integrity, freedom of action, and 
other human rights to the individual. The obligation to fulfill requires the state to take the 
measures necessary to ensure for each person within its jurisdiction opportunities to attain 
satisfaction of those needs, recognized in the human rights instruments.
38
 In sum, the state 
gives a promise to other convention parties to treat its citizens in a certain way. This 
promise can be realized through different means. Legislation is central in this regard, but as 
Høstmælingen puts it:  “human rights do not live its life through the law alone.” 39  As it is 
primarily the state that is the duty-bearer in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the 
individuals‟ rights, one may argue that the human rights system presupposes that the 
authority lies within the government of the state. This is far from the case in many of the 
worlds‟ states, because the power vacuum created by a weak state-apparatus is filled by 
other actors.
40
  This might be other state actors such as the military, or other regional 
powerbases, but also non-state actors such as the private sector. A government‟s ability to 
govern is different from state to state, and thus the degree of human rights protection of 
individuals will vary from state to state. Should this open for other actors to be held 
responsible for human rights protection and fulfillment? Protecting human rights 
                                                 
37
 Eide (1989) p.37 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Høstmælingen (2007) p.80 
40
 Ibid.p.86 
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exclusively through obligations on governments appear quite uncontroversial if states 
represent the only obstacle to human dignity and if all states could be relied on to restrain 
conduct within their borders effectively.
 41
  Nevertheless, this is not the case and a system 
where the state is the only target of international legal obligations may not be considered 
sufficient to protect human rights. It is important to underline that there needs to be a clear 
difference between the duties and responsibilities of the government on the on hand, and on 
the other, those of TNCs. Corporations can never be, nor should be expected to become, a 
surrogate government. TNCs attempt to uphold and support human rights should not 
redirect awareness from the critical need for national governments to create the 
fundamental framework for respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights. These efforts 
must be seen as complementary to the role of the states in implementing and enforcing 
national laws on human rights.
42
 The UN SGSR on business and human right‟s concept of 
corporate human rights responsibilities is built on three principles: i) protect, which implies 
that it is the task of the state to protect the people within its frontier against human rights 
infringements by non-state actors, ii) respect, which entail that it is the duty of the company 
to respect human rights and to put in place the necessary management structures to this and 
iii) remedy, which implies that it is essential to develop and strengthen judicial and non-
judicial complaint mechanisms in order to impose remedies for human rights infringements 
committed by companies. This thesis will focus on the two first concepts.
43
   
 
2.1.2 TNCs enormous impact and ability 
Demands of TNCs‟ responsibility towards the societies in which they operate are often 
based on arguments relating to authority and capacity. It has for a long time been 
recognized that business enterprises that operate across national boundaries have an 
enormous impact on the modern world, both in the societies where they operate, and in 
their home countries.
44
 Out of the 100 largest concentrations of wealth in the world, 51% 
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are owned by global corporations and only 49% of states.
45
 TNCs are of particular 
importance in relation to the recent global trends because they are active in the most 
dynamic sectors of international economies. They bring new jobs, technology and capital, 
thus they certainly have the capacity to assert a positive influence and foster 
development.
46
  
 
Ratner presents three arguments which support the view that corporate authority requires 
the human rights regime to move beyond the state as the only duty-bearer.
47
 Firstly, the 
aspiration of many developing states to receive foreign investment results in the 
government neither to have the interest nor the ability to monitor corporate behavior. This 
is both with regard to the TNCs‟ employees and with respect to the broader community. 
Secondly, independently of its situation regarding foreign investment, the governments also 
might need corporate resources for own abuses of human rights. Since repressive 
governments may need business to supply them with materials, corporations may cooperate 
with governments in abusing human rights. Thirdly, as TNCs have become more 
international, they have also become more independent of government control. Many of the 
largest TNCs have headquarters in one state, shareholders in others and operations 
worldwide. If the host state fails to regulate acts of the company, other states, such as the 
corporation‟s home state, may decide to withhold from regulation because of the 
extraterritorial nature of the acts involved.
48
 This leads to TNCs being able to move their 
activities to states with fewer regulatory burdens, including human rights regulations, in 
search of the largest possible profit.  Ratner‟s three arguments illustrate that the 
effectiveness of human rights‟ protection and fulfillment could potentially increase if one 
were able to address the corporations directly.   Altson argues that if the international 
human rights regime is not able to effectively address situations in which powerful 
corporate actors are involved in human rights violation or ensure that private actors are 
held responsible, it will both lose credibility in the years ahead and make itself 
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unnecessarily irrelevant in relation to important issues.
49
 The last 15 years we have 
witnessed a renewed pressure on states to adopt norms and policies to ensure that the 
business practice contribute to-, instead of contradicting, internationally recognized human 
rights. The TNCs themselves are also under pressure from different stakeholders in the civil 
society to pay attention to human rights. Nevertheless there exist important obstacles to 
TNCs acting in compliance with human rights. 
 
2.1.3 Reluctance in including TNCs 
There are different arguments made to claim that non-state actors such as TNCs do not 
have any responsibilities for respecting human rights, even of the minimal obligation to “do 
no harm”.  Andreassen observes three main arguments against TNC human rights 
responsibility.
50
 First, the principle argument is that states are the only actor who can ratify 
human rights treaties, and that they therefore are the only actor who can be held 
responsible for enforcing human rights obligations. This view is based on the consideration 
that international legal personality is a requirement for bearing international rights and 
responsibilities. The argument is that since TNC does not have any international legal 
personality, there is no binding international agreement that directly addresses corporations. 
TNCs are thus mere objects of international law and can bear no obligations towards the 
international community.
51
  The second argument against TNCs‟ responsibility towards 
human rights is the failure of attribution argument which must be seen in relation to the 
first argument. Since states are the only actor with legal personality one cannot say that 
human rights violations are perpetrated by private firms, but primarily caused by action or 
inaction of the government. It is therefore unrealistic and in some cases impossible to trace 
responsibility for human rights breaches to private firms.
52
 A third argument is based on a 
stay away/ trickle down argument which holds that private parties such as TNCs should 
avoid being involved in politics and human rights. The Nobel price winner in economy, 
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Milton Friedman, is maybe the person best known for his categorically denial of 
corporations‟ responsibility towards the societies in which they operate. In compliance with 
the classic liberalist view Friedman supports pure free trade. According to this view the role 
of the state should be minimal and the market mechanisms will guarantee a so-called level 
playing field, where all actors are equal and specialize within the sector where they have 
their relative comparative advantage. TNCs should only focus on commercial matters, such 
as investments and production and their activities in developing countries will eventually 
trickle down automatically by the so-called “invisible hand”.53  This will improve income 
opportunities of the poor and therefore also their general welfare. Friedman argues that as 
long as one does not cheat or fraud the corporation‟s social responsibility is accomplished:  
 
“There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long that it stays in the rule of the game, which is to say, engage in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.” 54  
 
Henderson is one of few in the contemporary world who supports this argument. He argues 
that many of the advocates of CSR do not understand the rational of a market economy and 
the roles of profit within it.
 55
  Holliday, Schmidheiny & Watts however, underline an 
important point by arguing that what Friedman wrote four decades ago, before the surge in 
globalization, deregulations and privatization cannot still be used as an argument.
 56
   
 
These three main counter arguments to human rights responsibility do not sufficiently 
explain why TNCs should not be responsible under international law when their actions are 
contrary to international recognized human rights norms. It is important to emphasize that 
there is an ongoing debate about how international human right law can tackle this issue 
since there is not any accepted consensus regarding TNCs‟ human rights responsibility. 
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The following section will argue that it is appropriate to place human rights responsibilities 
on TNCs and that international human rights obligations already exist both directly and 
indirectly to TNCs as non-state actors.
57
  
 
2.2 Direct human rights responsibilities of TNCs 
2.2.1 Deriving from provisions in the International Bill of Human Rights58 
Many multinational organizations have concluded that companies should respect human 
rights and some international standards already refer explicitly, or by interpretation, to 
companies. These include the International Bill of Rights, but also the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the OECD Guidelines for Multilateral 
Enterprises
59
 are important.  However, this section will focus on the former because of the 
scope of the thesis. The International Bill of Rights has been referred to by the UN as “the 
ethical and legal basis for all human rights work […] the foundation upon which the 
international protection and promotion of human rights have been developed.” 60  The first 
fifty years after the adoption of the UN Charter and the UDHR corporations generally fell 
on the outside of the mainstream debate concerning the promotion and the protection of 
internationally recognized human rights.
61
  The end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
success of expanding liberal economic systems have given private actors functions that 
before had been unthinkable to entrust them with.
62
 Questions have since then been posed 
regarding whether the corporations should not followingly be held responsible for their 
actions that affect human rights in the communities where they operate.
 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Weissbrodt and Kruger In: Alson (2005) p.328 
58
 The International Bill of Rights consists of the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, these documents have 
universal application. At present the ICCPR have been ratified by 165 states, and the ICESC rights by 160 
states.  
59
 ICHRP(2002) p.9 
60
 OHCHR, Fact sheet No. 22 p.3 In: Smith (2007) p.35  
61
 Forsythe(2006) p. 218 
62
 Alston (2005) p.7 
 19 
The international human rights regime is made by states, but can be argued to no longer be 
exclusively for states.  It is true, and important to note that the International Bill of Rights 
focuses primarily on the duty of governments, but they can also be interpreted to indicate 
that persons have both rights and responsibilities. The human rights standards set forth in 
the UDHR were deemed to apply primarily to the member states of the UN. However, the 
assignment of basic legal human rights obligations to TNC may find justification in the 
Preamble of the UDHR, which states that the Declaration is a: 
 
“common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual, and every 
organ of society, […] shall strive […] to promote respect for these rights and freedoms” 
 
One can thus argue that both states and “other organs of society”, such as TNCs, have 
responsibilities under the UDHR which announce the fundamental rights of individuals. 
Although the framers of the UDHR may not specifically have had TNCs in mind when they 
were drafting the preamble, the language used opens for flexibility in interpretation to 
legitimately include TNC as an “organ of society”. This is also reflected in the article 29 §1 
of the UDHR which refers to everyone’s duties to the communities and §2 of the same 
article which states that everyone‟s rights should be exercised with “due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others”. Furthermore article 30 states that no state, 
group, or person might interpret the Declaration in any way that is aimed at the 
destructions of these rights.  Judging by these provisions it could be argued that the UDHR 
also apply to non-state actors.  The UDHR is a declaration by the General Assembly, and is 
not by definition legally binding, but it does have a strong moral force.
63
  Andreassen 
argues that it is common to consider components of it a part of customary human rights 
law.
64
 
 
Article 2, §3a of ICCPR has also been interpreted in giving TNC direct human rights 
obligations. According to this article the state is obliged to ensure that 
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 “any person whose rights or freedoms […] are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity” (emphasis added). 
 
According to some observers the term “notwithstanding” would appear to indicate that a 
remedy is also required for violations by persons not acting in an official capacity.
65
 Other 
observers however disagree and argue that the word “notwithstanding” simply indicates 
that the state is responsible for the violations committed by its officials.
66
 Article 5 (1) in 
the ICCPR  has also been put forward as evidence for TNC direct responsibility, it reads: 
 
“Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein […].” 
 
One may interpret from this article that not only states, but also individuals have the 
obligation to respect the norms in the treaties, and since TNCs are made out of individuals 
the obligations also fall upon them. Jägers argues that since human rights are considered to 
be fundamental for the dignity of the individual, the realization of these rights should not 
only be valid with regard to protection against the state. The individual should be protected 
against all violation of human rights, and not only when the one who breaches one‟s rights 
could be directly identified as an agent of a government.
67
 
 
The issue of direct obligations on TNCs as non-state actors is more controversial and 
legally less acknowledged in human rights law than the indirect obligation addressed in 2.3. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a slowly evolving political will to impose on TNCs some 
responsibilities with regard to human rights. This is being seen through the growing 
international initiatives addressing direct, but voluntary, responsibilities of TNCs.  
 
2.2.2 Soft law and standard setting initiatives 
Many legal experts maintain that existing declarations referring to corporations are either 
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voluntary in character or so vaguely put, that they do not impose legal duties to companies 
to abide by human rights norms. However, the reality is more complex as both the OECD 
and ILO documents have the status of authoritative and high-level declarations of states 
and the UDHR remains one of the most respected and authoritative human rights 
documents.
68
 They amount to what is called soft law, which consists of declarations, 
resolutions, guidelines, principles and other high-level statements by groups of states. The 
concept of soft law is very controversial among international lawyers as it can be 
considered to blur the distinctions between law and moral pressure.
69
  The International 
Council of Human Rights Policy stated in 2002 that these soft laws are “neither strictly 
binding norms nor ephemeral political promises.”70 They should not be looked upon as a 
substitute for national law, but they can lead to coherence to standards for companies who 
operate in many countries. TNCs‟ CSR agenda, consisting of voluntary codes of conducts 
and public-private partnerships, fit into the wide category of soft law. Many argue that 
these codes of conduct should remain voluntary as soft law is becoming the norm in 
regulating international economic relations and that the rules are “flexible, adoptable, 
porous and not too constraining on state sovereignty and freedom of action.”71 Some 
observers support this argument by claiming that since each company is unique, the private 
sector‟s CSR standards should be handled with great care as there is no “one size that fits 
all.”72 Other observers, however, argue that global binding regulation should be introduced 
in order to secure that the private sector acts sustainably.
 
They criticize self-regulations 
because of the difficulty in sanctioning the corporations which do not follow their self-
chosen responsibility; they fear that CSR will consist of nice words on a piece of paper 
without any function. This paper argues that in absence of an international system which 
can legally hold TNCs accountable for their actions, there is room for voluntary initiatives 
as the international human rights system evolves. Voluntary CSR initiatives can generate 
pressure from the civil society and establish expectations of a certain level of compliance 
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with human rights issues by TNCs. If societal pressure is strong enough, these expectations 
can lead to national legislation. When states become concerned, they can further generate 
pressure on the international level in order to put certain issues on the international agenda, 
which can be helpful in the process of devolving international human rights law. In this 
way there can be a spiral process of legal development at the international level as a 
response to the need for development of human rights law in a world in constant change.  
 
One important voluntary initiative was launched by the UN in 2000 and is named Global 
Compact. The initiative has grown to more than 7700 participants, including over 5300 
businesses in 130 countries around the world.
73
  This initiative urges all private companies 
to commit themselves to respect the ten core principles in relation to human rights, labor 
rights and the environment. Even though this is a self regulatory mechanism, it does 
introduce human rights law into the policies of private entities and encourages them to 
report in compliance with the “Global Compact Guidelines for Communication for 
Progress”.  Participants are supposed to correspond with their stakeholders on an annual 
basis about their progress in implementing the Global Compact principles through for 
example their annual financial reports or sustainability reports.
74
   
 
2.2.3 International enforcement possibilities 
A central matter of concern regarding TNCs and their human rights responsibility is the 
issue of enforceability. Under the current international law it is generally not possible to 
enforce human rights obligation on private parties at the international level.
75
 Voluntary 
initiatives such as Global Compact introduced above can generate changes in corporate 
behavior since companies are urged to report on their performances, even though these 
initiatives are not enforcement mechanisms. National procedures should provide the 
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primary means of enforcement, but as this thesis illustrates there are many obstacles for this 
being achieved in an effective way. 
 
2.3 Indirect human rights responsibilities of TNCs 
2.3.1 Indirect responsibility originating from the direct obligations of the state 
Even though international law of human rights is primarily directed towards public 
authorities and their governments, it can be argued that it imposes obligations on non-state 
actors indirectly. This indirect responsibility originates from the direct obligations of the 
state where they are registered or where they do business to enforce their human rights 
treaty obligation.
76
  Thus the indirect responsibility falls both on the country of origin and 
the host country. The legal premise for this liability is that states are not only obliged to 
respect human rights, but also to protect and enforce them effectively. Eide‟s articulation of 
three different levels of obligations, notably to respect, protect and fulfill is helpful in 
understanding the state‟s comprehensive human right responsibility. It is the second and 
third obligations which are the most interesting with regard to TNCs‟ indirect responsibility 
towards human rights. As noted, the second obligation to protect requires the state to take 
the measures necessary to prevent other individuals or groups, such as TNCs, from 
violating the rights belonging to each and every individual. The obligation to fulfill 
requires the state to take the measures necessary to ensure for each person within their 
jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of the rights recognized in the human rights 
instruments.
77
 This paper argues that if TNCs‟ contribution is necessary in order to obtain 
human rights compliance, then both the host state and the home state should be required to 
ensure that the TNCs contribute subsequently. However, this argument is controversial and 
far from legally well settled.  What is generally more accepted is that the states are not 
fulfilling its obligation to protect and enforce peoples‟ human rights if they fail to protect 
individuals from harm by actors that fall under the category of “any organ of society”.78 
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2.3.2 Enforcing the state’s duty to protect human rights 
There exist today many international procedures which scrutinize the degree to which 
states are fulfilling their international human rights obligations. The UN and other regional 
mechanisms allow expert committees to review measures states have taken, and in some 
cases receiving complaints submitted by individuals. Some of these international 
procedures are well positioned to examine whether states are protecting citizens against 
threats committed by private actors such as companies.
79
 As noted earlier, national 
procedures should provide the primary means of enforcement, but there remain many 
obstacles for these being achieved in an effective way. Victims face many barriers when 
they use national courts to complain a company abuse, such as national law being weak or 
outdated. Other elements, such as procedural rules, the cost and the delays involved and the 
relative weakness of victims compared to TNCs, make enforcement difficult.
80
  
Nevertheless, Andreassen argues that in those cases where the country of operation is not 
willing to enforce through national legislation or where such legislation does not exist, the 
home country may take legal redress towards a company operation abroad.
81
 In some 
national legal systems the home country of a TNC has a duty to ensure that its jurisdiction 
is followed by extraterritorial business activities and that this jurisdiction is in accordance 
with international recognized human rights.
82
 However, this is far from the case in all 
TNCs‟ home states, and even in countries that have this duty “on paper” there are many 
obstacles for citizens living in the countries affected by TNCs‟ operations to actually be 
able to take up cases against these powerful actors.  
 
This indirect form of TNCs‟ accountability has the advantage of remaining within the 
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human rights legal tradition, where the primary legal obligations belong with states. Its 
weakness is that enforcement is left to national governments, which might be unable or 
unwilling to take the steps required to ensure that companies respect human rights.
83
 
 
2.4 Duality of obligations 
There is a certain degree of what Andreassen terms duality of obligations, because even 
though states are the primary duty-bearer, the private entities have a responsibility to 
respect the rights of other private entities.
84
 Even though the business sector does not have 
the same responsibilities as the state under the international human rights conventions, it 
must follow the national legislation which regulates much the same as the human rights 
does. The problem is that there remain several shortcomings in states being the only duty-
bearer towards human rights, as we saw in section 2.1.2.  The duality of obligations of state 
and non-state actors, such as TNCs,  is expressed in far too general terms in the provision 
of the human rights treaties to be of any value when determining the precise practical 
nature of direct state legal responsibility for private actors‟ harmful activities.85 
International human rights law is thus caught in a framework of state responsibility for 
human rights violation which is unable to deal fully with the changing role of the state in 
times of globalization.
86
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3. Extensive tax minimization and human rights: making the connection 
Some observers have started to realize that human rights advocates have largely ignored 
what is arguably the single most important element in evoking resources that enable the 
government to promote the realizations of human rights, namely the fiscal policy.
87
 
Extensive tax minimization as a an obstacle to the protection and fulfillment of 
internationally recognized human rights has not yet gained the support of the international 
community which is needed to make an impact on international human rights law. This 
might be because tax only recently has been considered as a human rights related problem 
necessitating international attention on a high level.
88
 Take the example of environmental 
concern, its link to human rights has taken decades to evolve and attain international 
support. Now environmental degradation is linked to many human rights violations such as 
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.
89
  Below three arguments will be 
presented in favor of incorporating tax related issues into the human rights agenda, in the 
same way as the environment already has been. These three main arguments are based on 
what Cobham outlines as the main goals of taxation.
90
  
 
3.1 The importance of tax 
3.1.1 Raised revenues 
Most evidently is the goal of raised revenues with which the government can meet its 
obligations toward its citizens in providing for fundamental internationally recognized 
human rights. Developing countries raise a much smaller portion of their national income 
in taxes than developed countries. The average for developing countries as a whole is less 
than 15 % of national income, and many raise a much smaller portion.
91
 In comparison, the 
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worlds‟ richest countries raise 37%.92 Extensive tax minimizations by TNCs have a clear 
impact concerning this issue, especially because of the difficulty of taxing personal income 
in many developing countries which have large informal economies. If the government 
does not receive tax revenues from TNCs which often are the largest tax payers in 
developing countries, the state cannot afford facilitating for its citizens‟ health services, 
education, security and other human rights related issues.
93 
This implies that extensive tax 
minimizations deprive people from their rights set down in the various human rights 
treaties. This paper supports the view that tax is crucial for sustainable realization of human 
rights, because persistent government financing is a key issue in this regard. In order to 
provide human rights for inhabitants in a country in a sustainable manner it is important 
that the means to finance public goods, which are crucial for the upholding of human 
rights, come from the government‟s own resources. The UNSG underlined this point in 
March this year by stating that: 
 
“Developing countries have the primary responsibility for mobilizing domestic resources for their own 
development in a sustainable manner. Sustained and equitable economic growth is a prerequisite for poverty 
reduction and international investment and trade can be important sources of support.”  94 
 
Tax represents an enormous potential for raised government revenues. The report "The 
Precarious State of Public Finance: Tax evasion, capital flight and the misuse of public 
money in developing countries – and what can be done about it" written by the Global 
Public Policy Forum, contains much new information and analysis about the importance of 
taxation of TNCs in developing countries. The report rightly points out that while the focus 
of many in the international community has been on increasing aid flows, too little 
attention has been paid to the much larger flows in the other direction.  If developing 
countries were able to collect sufficient tax, they would need less financing from foreign 
loans, which would reduce debt problems and make them be less dependent on foreign 
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aid.
95
 Action Aid has calculated that if developing countries were able to raise the portion 
of their national income from tax revenue to only 15%, they could realize an additional 
US$198 billion per year.
96
 This corresponds to all development assistance jointly, and is 
enough to meet and even exceed the annual Millennium Development Goals funding gap.
97
  
 
The literature regarding the importance of tax revenues for development often focuses on 
taxations‟ role with regard to issues which correspond to economic, social and cultural 
rights. This could be the result of the common assumption that ICCPR and ICESCR entail 
different types of obligations.  It is understood that ICCPR is followed by negative duties 
which do not cost anything to implement, as opposed to the ICESCR which according to 
this view is followed by positive duties. However, many commentators have shown that 
this is not the case, as both sets of rights require considerable government expenditure to 
meet its purpose.
98
 A report by the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and 
arbitrary execution concerning Guatemala from 2007 illustrates that higher state revenue as 
a consequence of a better fiscal policy is important also with regard to civil and political 
rights:  
 
“The reason the executive branch of Guatemala State has so little money to spend on the criminal justice 
system is that the legislative branch, the Congress, impose exceptionally low taxes […] Guatemala could so 
readily afford a better criminal justice system […] the lack of resources is due to the lack of political will: 
rather than funding a high-quality criminal justice system, Congress have decided to impose very low levels 
of taxation and, thus, starve the criminal justice system and other parts of the Government.” 99  
 
 
The Center for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights illustrates that tax policies are 
important for the compliance of economic, social and cultural rights in Guatamala by 
stating that: 
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“Failure to implement redistributive tax […] has undermined any meaningful progress in addressing poverty 
and inequality in Guatemala.  More than half the population lives in poverty, while the richest 10 percent of 
the population accounts for 43 percent of the country‟s income.” 100                                                              
 
According to Baker and Pogge there is a clear link between human rights compliance and 
what they term international financial integrity. They argue that there is an obvious 
connection between capital flowing out of the country and the growth of poverty in 
developing countries and underline the importance of these issues becoming an integral 
element of human rights advocacy.101 They argue that there are more people living in severe 
poverty today than the whole humanity in 1948 because of capital flight from the poorer 
countries is being accelerated through the global financial system. As extensive tax 
minimization consists of capital flowing out of developing countries it can in their view be 
said to be a cause of increased poverty. Mary Robinson once stated:       
 
“I am often asked what is the most serious form of human rights violation in the world today, and my reply is 
consistent: extreme poverty.”102                                                                                                                 
 
In compliance with this view the Vienna Declaration of the 1993 Conference of Human 
Rights observed that “extreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a violation of human 
dignity.”103 Measures to tackle extensive tax minimization will lead to higher public 
revenues which are necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, for tackling the 
widespread problem of poverty in developing countries. Since there is a growing consensus 
on seeing poverty through the lenses of human rights, it may be argued that the most 
efficient measure in raising higher national public revenues, which possibly would enable 
the government to handle poverty, should also be regarded as a human rights concern. This 
argument is based on article 2.1 of the ICESCR which states that governments should take 
steps to their maximum available resources in order to realize the rights contained in the 
covenant. The thesis will elaborate further on the fiscal dimension of article 2.1 of the 
ICESCR in section 3.3. 
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3.1.2 Redistribution 
 A second goal of taxation is redistribution which implies reducing inequality and to ensure 
that the benefits of development are felt by all.
104
 The current situation in many developing 
countries is characterized by “growth with growing inequalities” and this is especially 
interesting as the economic growth rates in many of these countries have not been as good 
as now in many decades.
105
  A report by a Canadian Government Agency underlines the 
importance of the goal of redistribution as it concludes that: 
 
“Guatemala‟s chronic problem with social development has been its elite‟s unwillingness to pay taxes or to 
participate in any initiative to redistribute resources”. 
106
  
 
Further the UNDP Human Development Report from 2005 states that: 
 
 “Overcoming the structural forces that create and perpetuate extreme inequality is one of the most effective 
routes for overcoming extreme poverty [and] enhancing the welfare of society […] inequality creates 
disadvantages for people throughout their lives. […] high level of income inequality is bad for growth, and 
they weaken the rate at which growth is converted intro poverty reduction: they reduce the size of the 
economic pie and the slice captured by the poor.”
107 
 
 
This paper argues that “the structural forces that create and perpetuate extreme inequality” 
is upheld by extensive tax minimization. Tax measures are often characterized as 
progressive or regressive. Progressive tax will take up a greater proportion of the taxpayer‟s 
income or wealth as it increases
108
, and is argued to make a substantial contribution to 
reducing inequality.
109
  However, there are those who argue that regressive tax rates are the 
best option for stimulating economic growth, because it takes away fewer resources from 
the wealthy, who in turn can invest these amounts in the economy. According to this view 
this will lead to job creation and innovation which will benefit all.  It allegedly also leads to 
more revenue for the state as lower tax rates for the rich means that they will be less 
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inclined to cheat or avoid taxes, and because its simplicity eliminates loopholes and 
deductions. Nevertheless, to the extent that these considerations are real, the supporters of 
regressive tax policies do not address the inherent injustice of this kind of taxation 
system.
110
  
 
Frey and Torgler argue that paying tax is a social act which reflects a desire to participate in 
a group, rather than economic maximization.
111
  Consistent with this view, research done 
by Bosco and Mittione show that tax compliance by a country‟s inhabitants depend on the 
perceived or expected level of redistribution.
112
  Arguments against using tax for 
distribution rely on the assumption that governments have at their disposal other tools such 
as the ability to make direct cash transfers to households. As there are many obstacles in the 
way for carrying this out in all low-income countries, this would mean giving up most of 
the governments‟ power to reduce inequality.113 
 
3.1.3 Representation  
Finally and most importantly, although often underappreciated, is the goal of strengthening 
and protecting channels of political representation.
114
  Representation is a crucial element 
of good governance and good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing. In 
fact, many commentators argue that the former is a precondition for the realization of the 
latter. Ross uses a panel of data from countries at all different levels of income to show that 
these channels of representation are systematically strengthened when the share of tax 
revenues in government expenditures is higher, meaning when governments rely mostly on 
tax.
115
  A recent report argues that governments that are more reliant on tax revenues are 
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likely to have a greater state capacity and be more responsive and accountable.
116
 A book 
by Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore, named “Taxation and State Building in Developing 
Countries: Capacity and Consent”, argue that taxation may play the central role in building 
and sustaining the power of states and in determining their ties to society. They believe that 
the state building role of taxation can be seen in two important areas: the rise of a social 
contract based on negotiating around tax, and the institution-building stimulus provided by 
the essential raised revenue.
117
 They note that: 
 
“Progress in the first area may foster representative democracy. Progress in the second area strengthens state 
capacity. Both have the potential to bolster the legitimacy of the state and enhance accountability between the 
state and its citizens.”118 
 
The channels of representation emerge from the process of taxation, because it can lead to 
the development of responsiveness and accountability by providing incentives for 
government and citizens to go into a “tax bargain” of a “fiscal contract”. In this bargain, 
citizens accept and comply with taxes in exchange for government provision of efficient 
services, the rule of law and accountability.
119
 Such bargains are mutually advantageous; as 
citizens receive improved governance wile the government receives larger, more 
predictable tax revenues.
120
  In absence of a long history of sustained, legitimate and 
representative governments, the systems of government can in itself an outcome of 
taxation.
121
 Many TNCs do not reveal the amounts they pay in tax to the country where 
they operate and thereby undermine the inhabitants of that country‟s ability to hold their 
governments responsible in coherence with the received tax revenues. In addition, the 
reality or perception that politically and economically well-connected corporations are not 
paying taxes can be principally harmful to levels of trust in the tax systems. Mittone argues 
that the observed levels of citizens‟ tax compliance depend on the perceived or expected 
level of others‟ compliance level.122  If the system is seen by the general public as optional 
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and open for avoidance by those who can afford to pay sophisticated tax advice, then this 
may lead to social discord and discourage compliance by other tax payers.
123
 This entails 
that the real and perceived compliance is dramatically weakened by the lack of 
international measures to tackle tax evasion and avoidance by large TNCs. Hence, these 
TNCs‟ extensive tax minimization does not only undermine revenue, but also undermine 
public confidence in the legitimacy of tax systems.
124
 
 
3.2 Extensive tax minimization 
As noted in the introduction, this thesis uses the term “extensive tax minimization” to 
describe both illegal tax evasion and irresponsible but legal tax avoidance. However, this 
section will handle tax evasion and tax avoidance separately. 
3.2.1 Tax evasion 
3.2.1.1 Definition and scope 
Williams defines this term as:  
 
“any criminal activity, or any offence of dishonesty punishable by civil penalties, which is intended to reduce 
the incidence of tax.”125  
 
Tax evasion is thus by definition illegal, but almost every commentator will also agree that 
it is unethical, both because of the means used to accomplish it, and because of its 
consequences - that legally due tax is not paid.
126
  It usually entails taxpayers purposely 
misrepresenting or concealing the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities in order to 
reduce their tax liability.
127
  Examples of tax evasion are when companies do not declare 
all, or parts of their income, or when a company makes a claim to compensate an expense 
against its taxable income which did not take place or is of a type not endorsed for tax 
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relief in the country concerned. Corporations may also make a tax claim that seems legal, 
but only because the relevant facts have been concealed.
128
 Tax evasion has an enormous 
impact on states‟ ability to protect and fulfill their human rights responsibilities because it 
leads to massive loss of government revenue. It has been estimated that developing 
countries lose US$500 billions every year as a result of illegal private outflows that are not 
reported to the authorities and on which no tax is paid.
129
 To put this number in context it is 
estimated that foreign public aid from rich to poor countries consists of US$50 billion 
annually. The Norwegian Forum on Environment and Development, a coalition of more 
than 50 Norwegian NGOs, has pointed out that bringing an end to illicit capital flight from 
developing countries as a primary objective for governments in order to receive higher 
revenues to finance development.
130
   
 
It is estimated that 60% of the world‟s trade now takes place within, rather than between, 
TNCs.
131
 According to several NGOs these transactions are carried out in an increasingly 
obscured way because figures to a larger degree are manipulated to reduce tax.  Global 
Financial Integrity, a research institute based in Washington D.C., has estimated that the 
amount of money that left developing countries in 2006 as a result of transfer pricing 
consisted of between US$ 471 billion and US$ 506 billion.
132
  A Christian Aid report from 
2009 quantifies for the first time the damage done to individual countries by mispricing. 
The massive sums this study exposes are in fact just the tip of the iceberg, as it could only 
analyze publicly available data. Information held back by secrecy rules in tax havens would 
arguably reveal a much more serious picture. According to the data obtained from the 
Christian Aid study it is evident that much of the illicit capital made from mispricing flows 
into the European Union and the Unites States while the victims are often poorer countries 
where the revenue authorities have neither the expertise nor the resources to fight back.
133
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3.2.1.2 Tax havens 
Many observers argue that most of the tax evading takes place secretly through tax havens. 
The OECD defines tax havens, or what they refer to as “harmful preferential tax regimes”, 
as having the following key features: no or only nominal tax rates, a lack of transparency 
and  lacking effective mechanisms which opens for exchange of information. TNCs benefit 
from the offshore system both indirectly, as tax competition between countries is partly 
driven by the existence of tax havens, and directly, as they may obtain affiliates in these 
offshore jurisdictions which can be used for tax evasion.
134
  Tax havens are said to be one 
of the most important aspect of the current globalization of financial business.  It is 
assumed that banks, funds, companies and other arrangements in tax havens hold about 1/3 
of the world Gross Domestic Product, even though they only represent 1 % of the world‟s 
population. Some observers see the use of tax havens as beneficial in the battle for human 
rights protection and personal freedom, because they see these closed jurisdictions as a safe 
refuge for people trying to protect their assets from oppressive regimes.
135
  
 
In Norway a Commission on Capital Flight was appointed by the Norwegian government 
to write a report about the relationship between tax havens and capital flight from 
developing countries.
136
 A draft of their report was given to the Norwegian Minister of 
Environment and Development in June 2009 and has created recent media attention in 
Norway concerning tax havens‟ secrecy rules and their harmful effects on tax competition 
all over the world.  According to this report corporations are able to utilize illegal methods 
for evading tax through registering their business in another country than where they 
actually are from, in order to benefit from low tax or even non existing tax rates. Because 
of tax havens‟ secrecy laws, which make it criminal for agents to inform outsiders about 
their clients, the people or firms that utilize these closed jurisdictions remain safe from 
outside scrutiny. On the one hand, tax havens can thereby argue that there is no evidence of 
them facilitating something illegal, but on the other hand it is questioned why these 
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jurisdictions should have secrecy rules if their clients have nothing to hide. Zimmer is one 
of those who have criticized this report.  Though a consultative statement he questions the 
Commission‟s alleged assumption that the entitlement of taxation only falls upon the 
home-state concerning how tax agreements distribute tax payment between TNCs‟ home-
state and host-state.
137
 He argues that the report assumes that if a TNC is registered in a tax 
haven, this closed jurisdiction alone has the entitlement of taxation from this company.  
Zimmer points out that tax agreements most commonly give the host state - the country 
where the TNC perform their activity- considerable taxation entitlements. However, as this 
paper have illustrated there are many ways in which a TNC can dodge paying tax in a host-
country.  Many will nevertheless see nothing irresponsible in TNCs using tax havens in 
order to reduce their tax burdens, given that there is no illegality involved.
138
 In addition, 
they might argue that if they do not make use of the possibilities available to them, TNCs 
would be failing their duties towards the shareholders in the company. The argumentation 
is that just because other corporations and individuals abuse these jurisdictions to evade 
tax, there should be no reason for them not to make legislative use of them. Contrary to this 
view, others argue that this is exactly why tax havens should not be employed to save tax, 
because they to some degree support economic activities which are at the very least 
morally doubtful because of their effect on tax competition, and are possibly even illegal.
139
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3.2.2 Tax avoidance 
3.2.2.1 Legality and ethics  
Companies can be taxed by the state in different ways. The main form of direct taxation for 
TNCs is corporate tax, paid as percentage of profit. TNCs may also be subjected to taxes on 
imports and exports, on capital gain tax and withholding taxes.
140
  TNCs have numerous 
possibilities to structure their activities and financial affairs in order to avoid these taxes. 
Above we have looked into some of the illegal tax minimization tactics, and below we will 
focus on legal tax strategies. It can be useful to distinguish between tax planning and tax 
avoidance. The term extensive tax minimization is used in this thesis in order not to include 
responsible tax planning, which is a taxpayer‟s right to adjust his or her economic affairs in 
order to obtain „the best outcome” in response to the tax system.141  Extensive tax 
avoidance on the other hand, occurs when one “uses artificial or contrived methods of 
adjusting tax payers‟ social, economic or organizational affair to reduce their tax liability in 
accordance with the law.”142 Which responsibilities TNCs should have when operating in a 
developing country is an ethical question, a question between right and wrong. This type of 
question is too often reduced to a discussion about law, about what is legal and what is 
illegal. Kolstad, Wiik and Larsen argues that this is unfortunate because there is no 
automatic coherence between what is legal and what is right or what is illegal and what is 
wrong.
143
 Given the weak law structures in many countries one cannot agree that activities 
that are not illegal are accepted. Below we will introduce one harmful outcome of legal tax 
avoidance. 
3.2.2.2 Race to the bottom 
Countries with comparable economic, political and social situation may compete with each 
other in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Because of comparable circumstances 
and TNCs‟ increasing ability to shift their business activities across national borders, host-
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countries seeking to attract FDI need specific advantages through which they stand out to 
foreign investors. Tax competition means that countries compete against each other by 
using tax-related or financial incentives to attract FDI.
144
  The incentives offered include 
lower tax rates on profit and capital, tax holidays which implies reduction or elimination of 
tax for a certain period of time, accelerated tax allowance for spending on capital assets and 
subsidies.
145
 The main long-term incentive offered by developing countries is a reduction in 
tax rates for corporations. Africa‟s low income countries have reduced their average 
statutory corporate income tax rate by 0.8 percentage points per year since 1990.
146
 A 
recent working paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 2009 states: 
 
“Most likely, the impact [of tax incentives] is negative, with the beneficiaries likely to be the wealthiest 
individuals, often located in foreign countries.”147 
 
As trade liberalization makes it easier to serve national markets from locations abroad, 
TNCs‟ decisions as to where to invest are more likely to be affected by tax 
considerations.
148
 TNCs are able to pursue a strategy of global competitiveness to obtain 
optional conditions for profit.
149
 Host governments can for example establish Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ) where TNCs producing for export are granted numerous 
concessions. ILO estimates that there are more than 3500 EPZs worldwide.
150
 The 
spectrum of investment incentives used by governments to win the favor of foreign 
investors is illustrated by an advertisement for EPZs in Nigeria: 
 
 “The regulatory regime for EPZs in Nigeria is liberal and provides a conducive environment for profitable 
operations. The incentives available to operators in Nigeria‟s EPZs compare favorably with the most 
attractive elsewhere in the world and are the best in the region. They include one hundred percent foreign 
ownership of investments, “one stop” approvals, no import or export licenses, duty free import of raw 
materials, unrestricted remittance of capital profits and dividends, tax holidays and no strikes.”151 
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All these incentives are costly for national economies and repeatedly lead to failed 
investment with serious consequences. Some observers argue that tax avoidance allows 
corporations to become economic free-riders, as they are able to enjoy the benefits of 
corporate citizenship without accepting the cost, while at the same time causing damaging 
market distortions.
152
 Others believe that tax avoidance is not harmful to national economy 
as they see tax minimization as favorable for investment and economic growth.
153
 A study 
by Mc. Kinsey Global Institute on the impact of FDI in Brazil, China, India and Mexico 
provides some concrete evidence for the opposite.
154
 The study shows that direct and 
indirect subsidies for foreign companies are costly for national economies. They place a 
burden on public funds and repeatedly lead to failed investments with serious 
consequences. A report by the Expert Group meeting on tax aspects of domestic resource 
allocation (hereafter the Rome report) recognizes this problem, arguing that certain projects 
might be so large or so influenced by political considerations, that tax incentives which 
have been competitively offered between countries, have negotiated away the need to pay 
tax in return for other benefits to the country, such as employment outcomes.
155
 The alleged 
outcomes “may over time be proved to be overstated, non-existent or even distractions 
from other investments likely to provide greater sustained development over the long 
run.”156  
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3.2.3 Summary 
The view on taxes‟ role in society varies in different economic schools. Some see tax 
minimization and tax competition as beneficial in the battle for human rights protection and 
personal freedom, and see the use of tax havens as a safe refuge for people trying to protect 
their assets from oppressive regimes.
157
 According to this view, tax competition should be 
applauded, and not persecuted because it creates higher innovation and higher economic 
growth as tax is not wasted on ineffective governments. Others see tax revenues as the 
lifeblood of democratic government and the social contract, and vital to the infrastructure 
of justice that underpins liberty and the market economy.
158
  This paper supports the latter 
and sees extensive tax minimization by TNCs as an obstacle to human rights compliance as 
scarce public resources hamper governments‟ ability to deliver to its populations on human 
rights issues.  
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3.3 How accepting extensive tax minimization by TNCs may violate state 
obligations towards the ICESCR : the fiscal dimension of article 2 (1)  
 
States are entitled to decide how and where they want to allocate their resources and as 
funds always are limited, states need to prioritize.
159
 Nevertheless, states undertake an 
obligation when ratifying human rights treaties, in particular the ICESCR which limits their 
discretion. When ratifying the ICESCR the state accepts certain duties according to the 
article 2.1. These include the following three obligations: firstly to take immediate steps to 
make sure that economic, social and cultural rights will progressively become available to 
all those who are under its jurisdiction; secondly to prohibit retrogressive measures; thirdly 
to devote a maximum of available resources to this purpose alone or in cooperation with 
the international community. 
 
3.3.1 Progressive realization 
Article 2 (1) in the ICESCR is of particular interest when examining which obligations 
human rights law imposes on states concerning tax.  The article reads: 
 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually or through international 
assistance or co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”(my emphasis). 
 
Hence, when states ratify this convention they accept a general legal obligation to take 
steps to the maximum of their available resources by all appropriate means, to 
progressively achieve the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. In General 
Comment No. 3, the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural rights (hereafter the 
Committee) elaborate upon what the various elements of this article imply.  
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Concerning the notion of “taking steps”, the Committee comments in § 2 that such steps 
should be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recognized in the Covenant”.  § 3 further states that the means which should be 
used in order to satisfy the obligations to take steps are put forward in article 2 (1) as “all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”. The 
Committee recognizes that in many cases legislation is highly desirable and is in some 
cases even indispensable. What the Committee does not mention is that legislation can be 
insufficient. TNCs operating in developing countries with weak institutions and fragile 
state apparatus may be tempted to take advantage of an insufficient legal framework which 
allows them to, for example, to withdraw extractive resources without paying back to the 
societies in which they operate.  This can be said to be the case in Zambia where millions 
of dollars are lost every year because of the government‟s low taxation of transnational 
mining companies operating in the country.
160
 Zambia is rich in mineral resources and 
despite the growing prices in the world market for the products which are mined out, the 
country remains one of the least developed countries in the world.
161
 Reductions in mining 
royalties payments cost US$ 63 million in foregone revenue between 2004 and 2006.
162
 
Agreements signed between the mining companies and the government has a tendency to 
give the mining companies huge concessional incentives witch tend to disadvantage public 
revenues.
163
 Even though extractive industries have the opportunity to contribute 
significantly to Zambia‟s economic development and provide opportunities for foreign 
investment and private sector development, experience shows that the presence of 
transnational mining companies breed underdevelopment and violation of human rights.
164
 
Kangamungazi  is the Economic Justice Programme Officer of Caritas
165
 Zambia and 
presented the following statement at the UN Consultation on Business and Human Rights 
in Geneva in October 2009: 
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“one of the most important factors limiting the contribution of this important sector to the development of the 
country are the differential treatments through tax concessions (tax holidays) that the mining industries are 
given, and also the deliberate avoidance of these mine companies to pay their taxes.” 
 
This case illustrates that even though host-state legislation is followed by TNCs, it does not 
necessarily lead to the company paying their share to the community where they operate.
166
 
 
In General Comment No. 3 the Committee does emphasize that “the adoption of legislative 
measure […] is by no means exhaustive of the obligations of State parties. Rather the 
phrase “by all appropriate means” must be given its full and natural meaning”. Further §7 
states that: “Other measures which may also be considered “appropriate” […] include, but 
are not limited to, administrative, financial, educational and social measures.” States‟ 
implementation of a taxation system which hampers extensive tax minimization should 
according to this theis count as these appropriate measures. The Concluding Observations 
on Angola from 2008 states: 
 
 “The Committee notes with concern that, in spite of the State party‟s significant economic growth and huge 
natural wealth, the amount of resources allocated to social services and public infrastructure is far from 
adequate. The Committee urges the State party take all appropriate measures, including by allocating product 
of oil and diamond revenues, to accelerate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of public infrastructure and 
social services in both the urban and rural areas.”167 
 
Assuring that TNCs pay taxes to the communities or countries where they extract their 
resources would, according to this thesis, count as an appropriate measures to progressively 
realize the rights set down in the convention. It is primary the responsible of the 
governments to design tax systems that will raise enough revenue to finance public 
investment. Governments should aim to strike a balance between raising revenue and 
attracting investment that will benefit its population as a whole, including poor people. It is 
clear that allowing extensive tax minimization implies that the state is not taking steps in 
the right direction to progressively realize the rights set down in the ICESCR. When states 
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fail to collect important tax revenues from TNCs, this thesis argues that states‟ resources 
are not being used maximally to realize economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
3.3.2 The prohibition on taking deliberately retrogressive measures. 
Under General comment no 3, § 9 the UN Committee has noted: 
 
“Any deliberately retrogressive measures […] would require the most careful consideration and would need 
to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenanting and in the context 
of the maximum available resources” 
 
In order to understand the Committee‟s statement, it is important to analyze what 
constitutes a “deliberately retrogressive measure”. However, the Committee has not 
provided a definition. The International Council of Human Rights Policy has found some 
guidance in General Comment number 4, §11, which states that a  
 
“ a general decline in living and housing conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative decisions by 
State Parties, and in the absence of any compensatory measure, would be inconsistent with the obligations 
under the Covenant”.168 
 
The International Council of Human Rights Policy argue thereof that a “deliberate 
retrogressive measure” implies any measure which involves a step back in the level of 
protection according to the rights contained in the Covenant, resulting from an intentional 
decision by the state concerned.
169
 Judging from this interpretation, a state‟s approval of 
extensive tax minimization by TNCs may constitute a deliberately retrogressive measure, 
as this implies a step back in the level of protection according to, at least, the rights 
contained in the ICESCR.  
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3.3.3 The responsibility of the international community 
The view that the international community has a responsibility towards human rights 
contained in the ICESCR can be found in the General Comment no.3 of article 2 (1): 
 
 “the Committee notes that the phrase “to a maximum of its available resources” was intended by the drafters 
of the Covenant to refer both to the resources existing in the State and those available from the international 
community through international cooperation and assistance”.170 
 
Having this in mind it is interesting to note that Pogge argues that most of the largest 
obstacles to human rights compliance in today‟s world can be traced back to institutional 
factors. He includes both the national institutional level in many developing countries, 
where the political and economic elite bear the primary responsibility, and at the present 
global institutional level, where the governments and citizens of the wealthy bear the 
primary responsibility.
171
  T. Pogge relies his arguments on article 28 of the UDHR which 
states: 
 
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized”.  
 
He further interprets this article to imply that an institutional design realize  human rights 
insofar as the human rights is fulfilled for the persons upon whom this order is imposed.
172
 
The long time objective of the international community should be to encourage and assist 
in developing institutions, managerial capacity and financial resources which are necessary 
to implement and enforce laws protecting human rights.
173
 In other words, the international 
community needs to assist governments in applying national human rights law in a way 
that is consistent with their international obligations. The responsibility to avoid obstacles 
to human rights compliance does not only fall on the host government, but also of the 
international community. Tax is essentially a political issue, and all governments should 
take responsibility for changing a global system that benefits the rich at the expense of the 
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poor.
174
 Combating extensive tax minimization in a way that benefit developing countries 
requires a forum that can create and enforce global rules designed to create a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms in the UDHR can be fully realized.  Up 
till now there exist no global body that possesses the political mandate, legitimacy and 
technical expertise needed to do this.
175
 The United Nations Committee of Tax Experts, for 
example, experiences a lack of political mandate and resources. 
 
3.3.4 Summary 
The view that individual states or the international community should be held responsible 
for not creating the conditions necessary for the realization of a fiscal policy which could 
lead to protection and fulfillment of rights in the ICESCR is very controversial and far from 
legally well settled. Finding no evidence that the Committee‟s concluding observations 
have reported back on country reports regarding fiscal matters, illustrates that the link 
between tax and human rights compliance is only in the cradle. This might partly be 
because the issue is politically defected because opposing political schools differ in their 
view on taxation. A state cannot be said to violate the human rights of the ICESCR by not 
hampering extensive tax minimization because there is not yet a universal acceptance of 
taxation being necessary in order to progressively realize the rights set down in the 
convention. Nevertheless, this paper argues that the state should have at least some 
responsibility to maintain its tax revenue from TNCs because of taxations potential role in 
promoting raised revenues, redistribution and representation.  
When we discussed the human rights responsibility of TNCs, we saw that the only way this 
could be found within the human rights legal framework was indirectly though states being 
responsible for non-state activities. The human rights obligations undertaken by 
governments require it to use all appropriate means to ensure that TNCs operating within 
its territory and are subject to its jurisdiction comply with national legislation designed to 
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give effect to human rights. What then when TNCs are operating in a host country where 
national legislation is not designed to give effect to human rights? Or where the legislation 
is present, but the state consequently overlook TNCs‟ breaches, or give legally grounded 
exemptions from these laws because they are so desperate in the quest for foreign direct 
investment? And the home state of the TNCs decides to withhold from regulations because 
of the extraterritorial nature of the acts involved. Should not the TNC have any obligations 
towards the citizens in the country where it conducts its operations since it is on their land 
that they conduct their operations?   
 
It must once again be emphasized that the primary responsibilities for the provision of the 
ICESCR fall upon states. However, when states fail to comply with their obligations 
according to human rights law because of insufficient resources, lack of political will or 
other inabilities, the TNCs can voluntarily take upon itself the duty to assist in the 
provision of certain economic, social and cultural rights. For the time being there is no 
binding legal instrument specifying the duties and the responsibilities of TNCs in this 
regard, but where national law is absent TNCs are expected to respect the principles of 
relevant international instruments.
176
 The role taken by TNCs is still purely voluntarily 
which is either based on goodwill or long-term economic and social policies. All company 
responses should, nevertheless, be based upon a commitment to promote and support 
human rights.
177
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3.4 The ethical responsibility regarding TNCs’ tax policy from a human rights 
perspective 
3.4.1 Introduction 
A report written by Kolstad, Wiik and Larsen about Norwegian CSR activities in 
developing countries addresses the issue of human rights and assigned responsabilities for 
corporations. One of the authors, Kolstad, elaborated upon some of the issues in this report 
in an article in Human Rights Review. This section will be based on their work. It is normal 
to divide between negative and positive responsibilities with regards to right realization. 
The former corresponds to what we have termed “do no harm” earlier in the paper, where 
one has the responsibility to avoid doing an action which harms other‟s welfare, rights or 
freedoms.  The positive responsibility or the responsibility to “do-good”, implies to act in a 
way which can ensure that rights of others are being looked after.  TNCs are commonly 
thought to have negative duties to respect human rights, but strong disagreements remain 
on whether they also should have the positive duty to protect, promote and fulfill human 
rights.
178
 
 
The report differs between the responsibility to protect others‟ rights and to have the direct 
responsibility to fulfill others‟ rights. This can be seen in connection with the three 
different levels of state obligations towards human rights introduced by Eide as noted 
earlier. However, the report differs from Eide in their distinguishing between two types of 
positive responsibilities, those of implementation and those of compliance. A key 
distinction here is between what Kolstad terms unconditional duties - which apply to every 
actor regardless of the action carried out by others, and conditional duties- which relate to 
tasks where there can be a division of moral labor.
179
 It is Shue who has pointed out that for 
certain duties there can be a certain division of labor, where different agents fulfill different 
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duties and that the sum of these actions will lead to full coverage in terms of rights 
realization.
180
 
 
3.4.2 The positive implementation responsibility 
The positive implementation responsibility implies to directly perform those actions that 
are necessary in order to protect and fulfill individuals‟ rights, such as creating social 
security, a system for redistribution of income and so on.
181
 It is thereby different from the 
negative responsibility which is an unconditional duty, something everyone has to pursue 
regardless of the action carried out by others. Shue points out that negative duties “are, and 
must be, universal”, meaning that they apply to everyone.182 The positive implementation 
responsibility can quite the contrary be better off if accomplished by a certain actor in 
society and is thus a conditional duty. Through such a moral allocation one can achieve 
specialization and coordination, which will be followed by a more efficiently realization of 
individuals‟ rights. The primary responsibilities for implementation would, according to the 
report, fall upon the actor who is best fit to carry it out. Normally one would count the state 
as the most natural actor to take this kind of responsibility, thus the primary responsibility 
to protect and fulfill rights through creating a system for poverty reduction or redistribution 
would generally fall upon a country‟s government. However, this view presupposes that a 
country‟s government will actually take the necessary responsibility, which is far from the 
truth in many developing countries. When the state is incapable or unwilling to take this 
responsibility, other actors in society would have to take it in order to protect and fulfill 
individuals‟ rights.183 Kolstad points out that this cannot be the full story, however, as any 
division of moral labor relies on the actions of other agents other than the duty-bearer.
184
 
There are for instance many examples of foreign governments or TNC which have 
undermined the ability of a domestic government to address its functions. 
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3.4.3 The positive responsibility to comply  
The positive responsibility to comply implies a responsibility to respect and make others 
capable of carrying out their positive implementation responsibility. This responsibility 
consists of unconditional duties, because it applies to every actor regardless of the actions 
carries out by others. States can only efficiently carry out their responsibility towards 
respecting, protecting and fulfilling individuals‟ rights if other actors do not undermine the 
state‟s role. The positive responsibility to comply thereby implies that one should not 
commit actions that undermine the state‟s possibility to carry out its tasks185, such as TNCs 
would do through extensive tax minimization.  
 
3.4.4 Summary 
According to Kolstad Wiik and Larsen TNCs have three types of responsibilities. Firstly, 
they have a negative responsibility not to make things worse where they operate, through 
for example contributing to increased poverty and breaches of human rights.  Secondly, 
they have a positive duty to comply, which means that they have to abstain from 
undermining the state or other actors‟ possibility to carry out their duties, which they would 
do through extensive tax minimization. These two forms of responsibility are necessary 
regardless of which country one operates in, and actions by others and are thus 
unconditional. The third responsibility entails conditional duties as TNCs have a positive 
implementation responsibility in countries where the state does not protect or fulfill a 
population‟s fundamental rights.  
 
However, neither the report, nor the article says anything about how to determine whether 
or not the state is able to take care of its obligations under human rights conventions.  
Nevertheless, it can contribute with several important aspects in the discussion of which 
responsibilities TNCs should have when operating in a developing country. According to 
the report and the article, TNCs should have a responsibility not to extensively minimize 
tax because this would breach their positive duty to comply. This is because by depriving 
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developing states of their tax revenues, the TNCs hamper the host governments‟ possibility 
to deliver human rights related issues to its population. In a human rights perspective, 
extensive tax minimization should be illegitimate because of its damaging effect on the 
ability of the state to perform its positive duties of implementation.
186
   
 
A company‟s positive implementation responsibility is more difficult to claim as it will be 
difficult to assess whether or not a state is able to protect and fulfill its citizens‟ 
fundamental interests. If the prospects are to implement these views on corporations‟ 
responsibilities in human rights law one should focus on the positive duty to comply, 
because the positive implementation responsibility will be too challenging towards the 
view on state sovereignty.  
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4. Utilizing an existing framework - the case of CSR  
International human rights law is caught in a framework of state responsibility for human 
rights violations which is unable to deal fully with the changing role of the state in times of 
globalization.
187
 As the world structure has evolved without the human rights regime 
managing to follow, a legal vacuum seems to have formed between nation states which 
today are open for TNCs to misuse. However, there is hope for this to change as 
international human rights law is not static, but evolves as international bodies, 
governments and national courts interpret them and set new standards.
188
 As this issue 
remains unsettled the term “corporate human rights responsibility” seems to be replaced by 
the term “corporate social responsibility.”189 The CSR agenda has reduced the attention to 
duties and to a considerable degree focused on economic argumentation, but is nevertheless 
an important issue that can put concerns on the agenda which have not yet gained support 
in international human rights law.  
 
4.1 Largely unexplored, growing interest 
The CSR agenda is driven by a demand for an ethical approach to doing business.
190
 There 
has recently been a growing interest from governments, the media and NGOs, about 
whether or not efforts to hamper harmful tax minimization by TNCs should be introduced 
on the CSR agenda. This recent attention has made the debate change from a narrow 
technical discussion for specialists to one that is more comprehensible for the general 
public.
191
 Despite the current attention, the relationship between TNCs‟ tax practice and 
CSR remains largely unexplored, a matter of concern which this thesis wants to highlight. 
Over the past decades the CSR agenda has moved from an initial focus on environmental 
issues in the 1970‟s and the 1980‟s, to embrace social issues such as child labor and 
employer‟s right in the 1990‟s. More recently the approach companies take to economic 
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issues such as “fair trade” has received attention.192  Judging by this, tax is simply the latest 
issue to emerge as part of a more thorough review of the economic impact TNCs have on 
the societies where they operate.
193
 Owns, the Director of OECD‟s Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration has stated that “tax is where the environment was ten years ago.”194 
There has been some positive movement through the growing attention to issues of 
corruption and greater transparency regarding TNC payments to the governments. Anti-
corruption is a core element in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, and 
was added as the 10
th
 principle of the UN Global Compact in 2004. It is also a central point 
in activist campaigns such as Publish What you Pay and Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. While corruption has emerged as a CSR issue, taxation has not.
195
 This is curious 
as paying tax is perhaps the most fundamental way in which corporations engage with their 
host societies and in some cases might be the principal element of their economic 
footprint.  The report “Taxing Issues: Responsible Business and Tax” consulting firm and 
think tank SustainAbility, finds almost no evidence that companies have looked at tax 
planning through a corporate responsibility lens.
196
  Christensen and Murphy argue that the 
fact that the CSR debate has scarcely discussed economic impacts has made it avoid 
considering tax obligations, the use of tax avoidance strategies, and the promotion of tax 
competition between the governments of developing countries.
197
  The quest for profit and 
the ability to lean on a legal principle that emphasizes tax payers‟ right to organize in order 
to avoid the most tax possible, have led to most TNCs being structured in a way that 
enables tax avoidance.
198
  Instead of trying to pay the absolute minimum in tax, TNCs 
should recognize a responsibility to the communities where they operate and ensure that 
they make a contribution to the societies where the wealth is created in the first place.  
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4.2 The potential value of adding concerns about extensive tax minimization to 
the CSR agenda 
Although there is a growing interest in the issue of tax and CSR, legal distinctions are still 
essential for many TNCs in determining levels of responsibility. Nevertheless, this paper 
has shown that protecting and fulfilling human rights only through responsibilities on 
governments to implement national laws is insufficient in today‟s world, as states are often 
unable or unwilling to realize laws which lead to human rights compliance. TNCs should 
therefore have some sort of responsibility with regard to human rights, at least a positive 
responsibility to comply, which means as noted above, that TNCs should abstain from 
undermining the state‟s possibility to carry out its duties towards human rights compliance. 
Even though issues on the CSR agenda still rest voluntarily and self regulating, they offer a 
potential source of pressure from the civil society that can drive improvement in one 
company or industry. Since human rights often are important elements of CSR policies, a 
certain level of human rights compliance could become normal practice through the 
expectations of society in general. This again can entail a pressure towards regulation to 
ensure a minimum standard of behavior of all firms. In this way there can be a persistent 
cycle of progress of corporate behavior.
199
  
 
Sen is known for valuing what Kant called “imperfect obligations”, which are what one 
should do, the acts that are reasonable, even though they are not possible to enforce by 
using the legal framework. Sen acknowledges that the course through law would be 
appropriate in many cases, but even here he emphasizes the importance of social and 
political activism. This role includes both generating social pressure for undertaking 
legislation and providing monitoring and scrutiny to ensure the effectiveness of the laws 
when they are endorsed. Even when no laws exist there is still room for social and political 
action through naming and shaming and other methods of bringing public pressure on 
violators of human rights.
200
 Informal social disapproval is often more powerful and 
effective than legal rules and can provide a more efficient and less expensive way to 
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achieve widely desired social aims.
201
 Bringing issues up on the CSR agenda is therefore 
important as it could to some extent determine what different stakeholders can expect from 
the TNCs and thereby offering a potential for pressuring them to act in compliance with 
human rights issues as they have said to do. If this pressure is strong enough, these 
expectations can lead to national legislation. If states become concerned, they can further 
generate pressure on the international level in order to put certain issues on the 
international agenda, which can be helpful in a process of legal development of 
international human rights law. 
 
Some commentators argue that tax evasion is not an issue to which CSR principles are of 
any use, not because such behavior is ignored or tolerated, but because it is already ruled 
out by law.  However, Fox claims that CSR does not only constitute of voluntary actions 
which go beyond compliance with legal requirements.
202
 He argues that: 
 
“voluntary and regulatory approaches have too often been treated as exclusive to each others, rather than 
options within a balanced approach to eradicating bad (socially irresponsible) behavior while encouraging 
responsible activities. Indeed, CSR practices are often embedded within the legal and regulatory environment, 
particularly when adherent to legal minima that are treated as a baseline for good practice.” 203 
 
This thesis has shown that just because something is considered legal, does not necessarily 
make it right. Voluntary initiatives may therefore be needed in order to, in Fox‟s words, 
“eradicate bad, socially irresponsible behavior”.  
 
Another reason why it can be useful to include the aspect of tax evasion on the TNCs‟ CSR 
agenda is because of TNCs‟ structure. CSR principles can be relevant to the difficulty of 
terminating the lengths to which the TNC should go, further than statutory reporting or 
withholding obligations, in an effort to exclude the opportunity for tax evasion by its 
suppliers, customers, contractors and employees.
204
 One can argue that relating CSR 
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consideration to tax evasion will enforce wider obligations in these circumstances, like 
obliging the TNCs to take at least some positive steps to maintain tax revenues of the state.  
 
4.3 The business case for including tax on the CSR agenda 
It would be naïve not to recognize that there are obstacles for TNCs that wish to undertake 
socially responsible activities. If they for example acquire costs which their competitors do 
not take on, they put themselves at risk of erosion of their competitive position. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to emphasize the positive potential of putting these issues 
on the CSR agenda as corporations will be best off if the general condition stays permanent 
over time and if the framework condition is more or less the same for all within the same 
industry.
 205 
As noted above, demands from certain sections in society can drive 
improvement in one industry to become normal practice through the expectations of society 
in general. This again can introduce legislation or regulation to ensure a minimum standard 
of behavior of all firms.
206
 In this way there can be an adjustment of corporate behavior 
since a corporation who does not adjust may risk a decrease in their competitive position. 
For many TNCs CSR and tax will be mainly a risk management issue based more on 
commercial factors and relative bargain power than the concept of fairness.
207
 In the report 
by Sustain Ability they outline three main sources of risk attached to the TNC by not acting 
socially responsible.  
 
4.3.1 Reputational risk 
The first risk arises from the possibility of negative press coverage of the company's tax 
planning. This dimension has been illustrated in Norway where a number of shipping 
companies have been widely criticized in the media for being “unpatriotic” in making use 
of technically legal steps in order to avoid tax by moving their headquarters to Cayman 
Island. In the United Kingdom some were shocked by the provocative comparison between 
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drink driving and tax avoidance made by the country‟s Costums. 208  Nevertheless, the 
association obviously demonstrates the emotion which the debates now provoke. The 
importance of reputational risk can easily be undermined as it is difficult to measure a 
concrete sum for the value of a corporate reputation. However, it is an issue that corporate 
management takes very seriously.  A survey by Price Waterhouse Coopers shows that 97% 
of corporations would be concerned about negative press coverage of their tax planning, 
and 40% cited CSR as the most important driver for measuring taxes paid.
209
 It is becoming 
increasingly apparent that a narrow legal approach to tax planning is unlikely to protect 
companies from charges of irresponsibility and associated reputational damage. Focusing 
entirely on what is regarded as an illegal or legal approach, and following planning 
techniques which uphold the law, but do not take into account potential harmful 
consequences, is likely to be increasingly controversial in the eyes of different 
stakeholders.
210
 Instead of focusing entirely on a complete boundary between illegal and 
legal approaches to tax, companies should focus on understanding what is responsible and 
what is irresponsible.
211
  
 
Williams argues that a fair and responsible quantity of tax for a TNC to pay is what reflects 
the purpose of the fiscal legislation, even where the legislative process has failed to protect 
that intention accurately in nature.
212
 However, he argues that in practice, difficulties 
frequently arise because there is genuine uncertainty as to what the intention of the 
legislature was. One should not only consider what the legislature indented by the 
provisions, but also which effect the provision would have had if it addressed the particular 
issues in question. In other words, it is necessary to go further than to determine what the 
lawmakers have done, to find out what they would have done in other circumstances.
213
 In 
the light of these thoughts it may be argued that host states probably would have acted 
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differently if they were not forced to minimize their legal standards in order to attract FDI, 
or in other words if they were not part of the  “race to the bottom”. One should not just 
accept that corporations take advantage of this situation. TNCs should not see tax as a cost 
to be avoided, but as a legitimate payment for wealth created to the countries and 
communities that contributed to the wealth creation in the first place. These concerns has 
less to do with fairness in the sense of treating all parties equally, than with a sense that 
they have a responsibility not to take advantage of countries that don‟t have the economic 
or political muscle to take care of themselves.
214
 Even though TNCs may not see them 
selves as having any goodwill towards other nations, they may however be very alert of 
world opinion.  
4.3.2 Regime risk 
A second danger is related to the important and increasing risk of litigation in the event of a 
company‟s taxation policy being challenged by tax authorities examining its affairs.  TNCs 
need to balance their desire to minimize tax in the shorter term, with the need to uphold 
good relation with tax authorities in the long term.
215
 There is also an increasing risk of 
companies losing admission to government contract if they undertake their activities 
through a tax haven or other activities considered unacceptable by the government in the 
host-country.
216
 Several efforts have been made in the United States for example, to limit 
contracts for companies which have moved their headquarters outside of the country for 
taxation purposes. 
4.3.3 Cash flow risk 
Finally, having confidence of future cash flow is often in itself an important component for 
business. Extensive tax minimization can according to Beloe, Cruickshank & Lye reduce this 
confidence for company management through inevitable uncertainties about some taxation 
liabilities, possible impact on future cash flow and the diversion effort such cases require.
217
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4.4 Summing up 
It is important to emphasize that an aim of the CSR agenda is to give TNCs an ethical 
approach in doing business and that it would be very inconsistent to be ethical in one area 
and not in others. Avery‟s example of a company that advertises their philanthropic 
contributions such as building a school in a developing country, and the same company 
avoids paying taxes that could build 50 schools in the same country, shows a clear 
disconnection in the value of the company.  Recent reports by NGOs have drawn particular 
attention to the damaging impacts of extensive tax avoidance in the developing world. To 
put it in Heard‟s words: 
 
“If one accepts that a company should try to be socially responsible it would appear that tax policy should be 
in line with its other CSR policies.”218 
 
Being better at CSR than one‟s competitors is going to be more and more advantageous as 
society‟s expectations from TNCs continue to change.   Still it is important to note that  if 
the latter were entirely true, then it is logic to assume that TNCs would be acting 
completely social responsible, which they do not. This is why it is important to examine 
which possibility the international community has to make TNCs act in compliance with 
the societies in which they operate. This section illustrated that there is a way for TNCs to 
deal with tax in a responsible manner towards the society where the corporation operates 
which is good for business. This will sometimes involve paying more taxes than the 
minimum required by law, even though the amount of tax paid to the host country could be 
reduced if all available opportunities were taken without considering their potentially 
harmful consequences. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Concluding remarks  
This paper has argued that extensive tax minimization by TNCs is a an obstacle to the 
protection and fulfillment of human rights, but cannot be said to be a human rights 
violation since TNCs do not have legal responsibility under international human right law 
to abstain from extensively minimizing tax. A state cannot be said to violate the human 
rights of the ICESCR by not hampering extensive tax minimization because there is not yet 
a universal acceptance of taxation being necessary in order to progressively realize the 
rights set down in the convention. Nevertheless, this paper argues that the state should have 
at least some responsibility to maintain its tax revenue from TNCs because of taxations 
potential role in promoting raised revenues, redistribution and representation. By not 
paying taxes TNCs are depriving governments of essential revenues that they need to 
deliver to their people on health, education, housing, security and other human rights 
related issues. Tax offers a potential source of greater domestic revenue which could be 
invested in public services for the protection and fulfillment of a government‟s human 
rights obligations. It is also widely viewed upon as preferential to other forms of 
government income because of its relative stability, its link with better governance and 
accountability, and the prospect it creates for greater autonomy for developing countries. 
The duality of obligations between state and non-state actors, such as TNCs,  is expressed 
in far too general terms in the human rights treaties to be of any value when determining 
the precise practical nature of direct state legal responsibility for private actors‟ activities 
which hamper human rights compliance. International human rights law is thus caught in a 
framework of state responsibility for human rights violation which is unable to deal fully 
with the changing role of the state in times of globalization. However, there is hope for this 
to change as international human rights law is not static, but evolves as international 
bodies, governments and national courts interpret them and set new standards. The 
responsibility for reform does not only lie with the governments in developing countries, 
only together with governments in developed countries and TNCs is it possible to end the 
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worldwide race to the bottom and tax evasion to tax havens. Exactly as human rights law 
was initially developed as a response to the power of states, there is now a need to react to 
the growing power of TNCs which influence the lives of millions of people throughout the 
world.  
 
In absence of an international system which can legally hold TNCs accountable for their 
actions which hamper human rights compliance, there is room for voluntary CSR 
initiatives. This thesis has illustrated that for the CSR agenda to uphold its superior frame 
of sustainable development and human rights there is a crucial need to implement strategies 
that hamper extensive tax minimization and its harmful consequences on developing 
countries. In a human rights perspective, extensive tax minimization should be illegitimate 
because of its damaging effect on the ability of the state to perform its positive duties of 
implementation, which implies to directly perform those actions that are necessary in order 
to protect and fulfill individuals‟ rights. Ideally, voluntary CSR initiatives (e.g. Global 
Compact) generate pressure from civil society and establish expectations of TNCs to act in 
compliance with human rights. If societal pressure is strong enough, such expectations can 
lead to national legislation. When states become concerned, they can further generate 
pressure on the international level in order to put certain issues on the international agenda, 
which can be helpful in developing international human rights law. In this way there can be 
a spiral process of legal development at the international level as a response to a need for 
development of human rights law in a world in constant change. Hopefully, the CSR 
agenda can create a coherence of standards for TNCs and facilitate the process of 
generating enough pressure which would make it possible to include important fiscal 
matters on the arena of international human rights law.  As human rights law is evolving, 
the CSR agenda can help getting focus away from TNCs only being liable towards 
insufficient legal standards and towards considering what can be regard as responsible 
behavior towards the community as a whole.  
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5.2 Looking forward  
Because the topic of tax as a human rights concern is a new and upcoming issue on the 
international community‟s agenda, there is a vital need for more research to facilitate this 
debate. A cautious debate around these issues may be helpful in order to establish a 
consensus on some basic principles which could hamper extensive tax minimization. A 
reasoned, rather than judgmental, approach may encourage TNCs to become more 
transparent with regard to their tax policy. Some research is already on its way, as for 
example The Committee of Experts on International Cooperation on Tax matters‟ work on 
observing the effects of tax competition in corporate tax and tax incentives that have 
worked and not worked in attracting FDI. Other initiatives, such as the proposed UN Code 
of Conduct on Cooperation in Combating International Tax Evasion and Avoidance and the 
OECD Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information, are also being 
elaborated upon.  It might be difficult in principle to create universal rules to decide what is 
fair and what is responsible concerning tax related matters because of the complexity of the 
issue. In practice, however, it might be easier to distinguish, and avoid behavior that falls 
far from these goals. There is a need for a model capable of fighting extensive tax 
minimization which is neither so restrictive that it will only be effective in the worst scene 
scenario, nor so inclusive that it will be politically unacceptable except in the most ethical 
compliant states and corporations. 
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